tar: strip unsafe hardlink components - GNU tar does the same
Defends against files like these (python reproducer):
import tarfile
ti = tarfile.TarInfo("leak_hosts")
ti.type = tarfile.LNKTYPE
ti.linkname = "/etc/hosts" # or "../etc/hosts" or ".."
ti.size = 0
with tarfile.open("/tmp/hardlink.tar", "w") as t:
t.addfile(ti)
function old new delta
skip_unsafe_prefix - 127 +127
get_header_tar 1752 1754 +2
.rodata 106861 106856 -5
unzip_main 2715 2706 -9
strip_unsafe_prefix 102 18 -84
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(add/remove: 1/0 grow/shrink: 1/3 up/down: 129/-98) Total: 31 bytes
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
This commit is contained in:
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768ab5384c
commit
3fb6b31c71
8 files changed
+49
-18
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@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@ void FAST_FUNC data_extract_all(archive_handle_t *archive_handle)
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}
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#endif
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#if ENABLE_FEATURE_PATH_TRAVERSAL_PROTECTION
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/* Strip leading "/" and up to last "/../" path component */
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dst_name = (char *)strip_unsafe_prefix(dst_name);
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/* Skip leading "/" and past last ".." path component */
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dst_name = (char *)skip_unsafe_prefix(dst_name);
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#endif
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// ^^^ This may be a problem if some applets do need to extract absolute names.
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// (Probably will need to invent ARCHIVE_ALLOW_UNSAFE_NAME flag).
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@@ -185,8 +185,7 @@ void FAST_FUNC data_extract_all(archive_handle_t *archive_handle)
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/* To avoid a directory traversal attack via symlinks,
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* do not restore symlinks with ".." components
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* or symlinks starting with "/", unless a magic
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* envvar is set.
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* or symlinks starting with "/"
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*
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* For example, consider a .tar created via:
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* $ tar cvf bug.tar anything.txt
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@@ -454,8 +454,15 @@ char FAST_FUNC get_header_tar(archive_handle_t *archive_handle)
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#endif
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/* Everything up to and including last ".." component is stripped */
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overlapping_strcpy(file_header->name, strip_unsafe_prefix(file_header->name));
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//TODO: do the same for file_header->link_target?
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strip_unsafe_prefix(file_header->name);
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if (file_header->link_target) {
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/* GNU tar 1.34 examples:
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* tar: Removing leading '/' from hard link targets
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* tar: Removing leading '../' from hard link targets
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* tar: Removing leading 'etc/../' from hard link targets
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*/
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strip_unsafe_prefix(file_header->link_target);
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}
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/* Strip trailing '/' in directories */
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/* Must be done after mode is set as '/' is used to check if it's a directory */
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@@ -5,11 +5,11 @@
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#include "libbb.h"
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#include "bb_archive.h"
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const char* FAST_FUNC strip_unsafe_prefix(const char *str)
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const char* FAST_FUNC skip_unsafe_prefix(const char *str)
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{
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const char *cp = str;
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while (1) {
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char *cp2;
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const char *cp2;
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if (*cp == '/') {
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cp++;
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continue;
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@@ -22,10 +22,25 @@ const char* FAST_FUNC strip_unsafe_prefix(const char *str)
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cp += 3;
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continue;
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}
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cp2 = strstr(cp, "/../");
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cp2 = cp;
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find_dotdot:
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cp2 = strstr(cp2, "/..");
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if (!cp2)
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break;
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cp = cp2 + 4;
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break; /* No (more) malicious components */
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/* We found "/..something" */
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cp2 += 3;
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if (*cp2 != '/') {
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if (*cp2 == '\0') {
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/* Trailing "/..": malicious, return "" */
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/* (causes harmless errors trying to create or hardlink a file named "") */
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return cp2;
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}
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/* "/..name" is not malicious, look for next "/.." */
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goto find_dotdot;
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}
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/* Found "/../": malicious, advance past it */
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cp = cp2 + 1;
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}
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if (cp != str) {
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static smallint warned = 0;
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@@ -37,3 +52,8 @@ const char* FAST_FUNC strip_unsafe_prefix(const char *str)
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}
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return cp;
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}
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void FAST_FUNC strip_unsafe_prefix(char *str)
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{
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overlapping_strcpy(str, skip_unsafe_prefix(str));
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}
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@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ void FAST_FUNC create_links_from_list(llist_t *list)
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*list->data ? "hard" : "sym",
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list->data + 1, target
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);
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/* Note: GNU tar 1.34 errors out only _after_ all links are (attempted to be) created */
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}
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list = list->link;
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}
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+1
-1
@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ static int FAST_FUNC writeFileToTarball(struct recursive_state *state,
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DBG("writeFileToTarball('%s')", fileName);
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/* Strip leading '/' and such (must be before memorizing hardlink's name) */
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header_name = strip_unsafe_prefix(fileName);
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header_name = skip_unsafe_prefix(fileName);
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if (header_name[0] == '\0')
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return TRUE;
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+1
-1
@@ -860,7 +860,7 @@ int unzip_main(int argc, char **argv)
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/* Guard against "/abspath", "/../" and similar attacks */
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// NB: UnZip 6.00 has option -: to disable this
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overlapping_strcpy(dst_fn, strip_unsafe_prefix(dst_fn));
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strip_unsafe_prefix(dst_fn);
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/* Filter zip entries */
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if (find_list_entry(zreject, dst_fn)
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@@ -202,7 +202,8 @@ char get_header_tar_xz(archive_handle_t *archive_handle) FAST_FUNC;
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void seek_by_jump(int fd, off_t amount) FAST_FUNC;
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void seek_by_read(int fd, off_t amount) FAST_FUNC;
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const char *strip_unsafe_prefix(const char *str) FAST_FUNC;
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const char *skip_unsafe_prefix(const char *str) FAST_FUNC;
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void strip_unsafe_prefix(char *str) FAST_FUNC;
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void create_or_remember_link(llist_t **link_placeholders,
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const char *target,
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const char *linkname,
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@@ -213,7 +213,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
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write_and_die(1, "Status: 429 Too Many Requests\r\n"
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"Content-Type: text/plain\r\n"
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"Retry-After: 60\r\n"
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"Connection: close\r\n\r\n"
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"Connection: close\r\n"
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"\r\n"
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"Too many concurrent requests\n"
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);
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return 0;
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@@ -223,7 +224,9 @@ exec:
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execv(argv[0], argv);
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full_write2(2, "can't execute", argv[0]);
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write_and_die(1, "Status: 500 Internal Server Error\r\n"
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"Content-Type: text/plain\r\n\r\n"
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"Failed to execute binary\n");
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"Content-Type: text/plain\r\n"
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"\r\n"
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"Can't execute binary\n"
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);
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return 1;
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}
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}
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