security: let security modules use PTRACE_MODE_* with bitmasks

It looks like smack and yama weren't aware that the ptrace mode
can have flags ORed into it - PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT until now, but
only for /proc/$pid/stat, and with the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS patch,
all modes have flags ORed into them.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
Jann Horn authored and Linus Torvalds committed 2016-01-20 17:09:18 -08:00
1 parent 570ac9337b
commit 3dfb7d8cdb
2 files changed
+5 -7

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+3 -5
View File
@@ -398,12 +398,10 @@ static int smk_copy_relabel(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
*/
static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
{
switch (mode) {
case PTRACE_MODE_READ:
return MAY_READ;
case PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH:
if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)
return MAY_READWRITE;
}
if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
return MAY_READ;
return 0;
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
int rc = 0;
/* require ptrace target be a child of ptracer on attach */
if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) {
if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) {
switch (ptrace_scope) {
case YAMA_SCOPE_DISABLED:
/* No additional restrictions. */
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
}
}
if (rc) {
if (rc && (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE
"ptrace of pid %d was attempted by: %s (pid %d)\n",
child->pid, current->comm, current->pid);