The patch below fixes a problem in the iptables SECMARK target, where
the user-supplied 'selctx' string may not be nul-terminated.
From initial analysis, it seems that the strlen() called from
selinux_string_to_sid() could run until it arbitrarily finds a zero,
and possibly cause a kernel oops before then.
The impact of this appears limited because the operation requires
CAP_NET_ADMIN, which is essentially always root. Also, the module is
not yet in wide use.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Implement an LSM hook for setting a task's IO priority, similar to the hook
for setting a tasks's nice value.
A previous version of this LSM hook was included in an older version of
multiadm by Jan Engelhardt, although I don't recall it being submitted
upstream.
Also included is the corresponding SELinux hook, which re-uses the setsched
permission in the proccess class.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Cc: Jan Engelhardt <[email protected]>
Cc: Chris Wright <[email protected]>
Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Add new per-packet access controls to SELinux, replacing the old
packet controls.
Packets are labeled with the iptables SECMARK and CONNSECMARK targets,
then security policy for the packets is enforced with these controls.
To allow for a smooth transition to the new controls, the old code is
still present, but not active by default. To restore previous
behavior, the old controls may be activated at runtime by writing a
'1' to /selinux/compat_net, and also via the kernel boot parameter
selinux_compat_net. Switching between the network control models
requires the security load_policy permission. The old controls will
probably eventually be removed and any continued use is discouraged.
With this patch, the new secmark controls for SElinux are disabled by
default, so existing behavior is entirely preserved, and the user is
not affected at all.
It also provides a config option to enable the secmark controls by
default (which can always be overridden at boot and runtime). It is
also noted in the kconfig help that the user will need updated
userspace if enabling secmark controls for SELinux and that they'll
probably need the SECMARK and CONNMARK targets, and conntrack protocol
helpers, although such decisions are beyond the scope of kernel
configuration.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Add a new xtables target, CONNSECMARK, which is used to specify rules
for copying security marks from packets to connections, and for
copyying security marks back from connections to packets. This is
similar to the CONNMARK target, but is more limited in scope in that
it only allows copying of security marks to and from packets, as this
is all it needs to do.
A typical scenario would be to apply a security mark to a 'new' packet
with SECMARK, then copy that to its conntrack via CONNMARK, and then
restore the security mark from the connection to established and
related packets on that connection.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Add a secmark field to IP and NF conntracks, so that security markings
on packets can be copied to their associated connections, and also
copied back to packets as required. This is similar to the network
mark field currently used with conntrack, although it is intended for
enforcement of security policy rather than network policy.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Add a SECMARK target to xtables, allowing the admin to apply security
marks to packets via both iptables and ip6tables.
The target currently handles SELinux security marking, but can be
extended for other purposes as needed.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Add a secmark field to the skbuff structure, to allow security subsystems to
place security markings on network packets. This is similar to the nfmark
field, except is intended for implementing security policy, rather than than
networking policy.
This patch was already acked in principle by Dave Miller.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Add and export new functions to the in-kernel SELinux API in support of the
new secmark-based packet controls.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Secmark implements a new scheme for adding security markings to
packets via iptables, as well as changes to SELinux to use these
markings for security policy enforcement. The rationale for this
scheme is explained and discussed in detail in the original threads:
http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/34927/http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/35244/
Examples of policy and rulesets, as well as a full archive of patches
for iptables and SELinux userland, may be found at:
http://people.redhat.com/jmorris/selinux/secmark/
The code has been tested with various compilation options and in
several scenarios, including with 'complicated' protocols such as FTP
and also with the new generic conntrack code with IPv6 connection
tracking.
This patch:
Add support for a new object class ('packet'), and associated
permissions ('send', 'recv', 'relabelto'). These are used to enforce
security policy for network packets labeled with SECMARK, and for
adding labeling rules.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
This patch addresses a flaw in LSM, where there is no mediation of readv()
and writev() in for 32-bit compatible apps using a 64-bit kernel.
This bug was discovered and fixed initially in the native readv/writev
code [1], but was not fixed in the compat code. Thanks to Al for spotting
this one.
[1] http://lwn.net/Articles/154282/
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Add a slab cache for the SELinux inode security struct, one of which is
allocated for every inode instantiated by the system.
The memory savings are considerable.
On 64-bit, instead of the size-128 cache, we have a slab object of 96
bytes, saving 32 bytes per object. After booting, I see about 4000 of
these and then about 17,000 after a kernel compile. With this patch, we
save around 530KB of kernel memory in the latter case. On 32-bit, the
savings are about half of this.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
A further fix is needed for selinuxfs link count management, to ensure that
the count is correct for the parent directory when a subdirectory is
created. This is only required for the root directory currently, but the
code has been updated for the general case.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Fix copy & paste error in sel_make_avc_files(), removing a supurious call to
d_genocide() in the error path. All of this will be cleaned up by
kill_litter_super().
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Remove the call to sel_make_bools() from sel_fill_super(), as policy needs to
be loaded before the boolean files can be created. Policy will never be
loaded during sel_fill_super() as selinuxfs is kernel mounted during init and
the only means to load policy is via selinuxfs.
Also, the call to d_genocide() on the error path of sel_make_bools() is
incorrect and replaced with sel_remove_bools().
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Unify the error path of sel_fill_super() so that all errors pass through the
same point and generate an error message. Also, removes a spurious dput() in
the error path which breaks the refcounting for the filesystem
(litter_kill_super() will correctly clean things up itself on error).
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Use existing sel_make_dir() helper to create booleans directory rather than
duplicating the logic.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Fix the hard link count for selinuxfs directories, which are currently one
short.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
This patch allows SELinux to canonicalize the value returned from
getxattr() via the security_inode_getsecurity() hook, which is called after
the fs level getxattr() function.
The purpose of this is to allow the in-core security context for an inode
to override the on-disk value. This could happen in cases such as
upgrading a system to a different labeling form (e.g. standard SELinux to
MLS) without needing to do a full relabel of the filesystem.
In such cases, we want getxattr() to return the canonical security context
that the kernel is using rather than what is stored on disk.
The implementation hooks into the inode_getsecurity(), adding another
parameter to indicate the result of the preceding fs-level getxattr() call,
so that SELinux knows whether to compare a value obtained from disk with
the kernel value.
We also now allow getxattr() to work for mountpoint labeled filesystems
(i.e. mount with option context=foo_t), as we are able to return the
kernel value to the user.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
This patch converts SELinux code from kmalloc/memset to the new kazalloc
unction. On i386, this results in a text saving of over 1K.
Before:
text data bss dec hex filename
86319 4642 15236 106197 19ed5 security/selinux/built-in.o
After:
text data bss dec hex filename
85278 4642 15236 105156 19ac4 security/selinux/built-in.o
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
The following patch updates the way SELinux classifies and handles IP
based protocols.
Currently, IP sockets are classified by SELinux as being either TCP, UDP
or 'Raw', the latter being a default for IP socket that is not TCP or UDP.
The classification code is out of date and uses only the socket type
parameter to socket(2) to determine the class of IP socket. So, any
socket created with SOCK_STREAM will be classified by SELinux as TCP, and
SOCK_DGRAM as UDP. Also, other socket types such as SOCK_SEQPACKET and
SOCK_DCCP are currently ignored by SELinux, which classifies them as
generic sockets, which means they don't even get basic IP level checking.
This patch changes the SELinux IP socket classification logic, so that
only an IPPROTO_IP protocol value passed to socket(2) classify the socket
as TCP or UDP. The patch also drops the check for SOCK_RAW and converts
it into a default, so that socket types like SOCK_DCCP and SOCK_SEQPACKET
are classified as SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET (instead of generic sockets).
Note that protocol-specific support for SCTP, DCCP etc. is not addressed
here, we're just getting these protocols checked at the IP layer.
This fixes a reported problem where SCTP sockets were being recognized as
generic SELinux sockets yet still being passed in one case to an IP level
check, which then fails for generic sockets.
It will also fix bugs where any SOCK_STREAM socket is classified as TCP or
any SOCK_DGRAM socket is classified as UDP.
This patch also unifies the way IP sockets classes are determined in
selinux_socket_bind(), so we use the already calculated value instead of
trying to recalculate it.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
This fixes a bug in the capifs initialization code, where the
filesystem is not unregistered if kern_mount() fails.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
James Morris