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8cac89909a
Pull thread fixes from Christian Brauner:
"Here is an urgent fix for ptrace_may_access() permission checking.
Commit 69f594a389 ("ptrace: do not audit capability check when
outputing /proc/pid/stat") introduced the ability to opt out of audit
messages for accesses to various proc files since they are not
violations of policy.
While doing so it switched the check from ns_capable() to
has_ns_capability{_noaudit}(). That means it switched from checking
the subjective credentials (ktask->cred) of the task to using the
objective credentials (ktask->real_cred). This is appears to be wrong.
ptrace_has_cap() is currently only used in ptrace_may_access() And is
used to check whether the calling task (subject) has the
CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability in the provided user namespace to operate on
the target task (object). According to the cred.h comments this means
the subjective credentials of the calling task need to be used.
With this fix we switch ptrace_has_cap() to use security_capable() and
thus back to using the subjective credentials.
As one example where this might be particularly problematic, Jann
pointed out that in combination with the upcoming IORING_OP_OPENAT{2}
feature, this bug might allow unprivileged users to bypass the
capability checks while asynchronously opening files like /proc/*/mem,
because the capability checks for this would be performed against
kernel credentials.
To illustrate on the former point about this being exploitable: When
io_uring creates a new context it records the subjective credentials
of the caller. Later on, when it starts to do work it creates a kernel
thread and registers a callback. The callback runs with kernel creds
for ktask->real_cred and ktask->cred.
To prevent this from becoming a full-blown 0-day io_uring will call
override_cred() and override ktask->cred with the subjective
credentials of the creator of the io_uring instance. With
ptrace_has_cap() currently looking at ktask->real_cred this override
will be ineffective and the caller will be able to open arbitray proc
files as mentioned above.
Luckily, this is currently not exploitable but would be so once
IORING_OP_OPENAT{2} land in v5.6. Let's fix it now.
To minimize potential regressions I successfully ran the criu
testsuite. criu makes heavy use of ptrace() and extensively hits
ptrace_may_access() codepaths and has a good change of detecting any
regressions.
Additionally, I succesfully ran the ptrace and seccomp kernel tests"
* tag 'for-linus-2020-01-18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
ptrace: reintroduce usage of subjective credentials in ptrace_has_cap()
Linux kernel
============
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There are various text files in the Documentation/ subdirectory,
several of them using the Restructured Text markup notation.
Please read the Documentation/process/changes.rst file, as it contains the
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the problems which may result by upgrading your kernel.